Timely vs. Delayed CEO Resignation and Company Performance by Wu, Xuan








The John Molson School of Business 
Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements 
for the Degree of Master of Science in Administration (Finance Option)  
at 
Concordia University 






© Xuan Wu, 2014 
  
CONCORDIA UNIVERSITY  
School of Graduate Studies 
 
This is to certify that the thesis prepared  
By: Xuan Wu  
Entitled: Timely vs. Delayed CEO Resignation and Company Performance  
and submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of  
Master of Science in Administration (Finance Option) 
complies with the regulations of the University and meets the accepted standards with 
respect to originality and quality.  
Signed by the final examining committee:  
________________________________ Chair  
Dr. Satyaveer Chauhan 
________________________________ Examiner  
Dr. Sandra Betton 
________________________________ Examiner  
Dr. Harjeet S. Bhabra  
________________________________ Co-supervisor  
Dr. Saif Ullah 
________________________________ Co-supervisor  
Dr. Thomas Walker  
 
Approved by ____________________________________________ 
   Chair of Department or Graduate Program Director 
Dr. Harjeet S. Bhabra 
      ____________________________________________ 
Dean of Faculty 
Dr. Steve Harvey 
 
Date ____________________________________________ 





Timely vs. Delayed CEO Resignation and Company Performance 
Xuan Wu 
This paper investigates changes in company performance following timely 
versus delayed CEO resignations after violations of financial wrongdoings. A 
resignation is considered timely if it is proactively pushed by the company, and 
delayed if it is driven by investigations initiated by SEC or other regulatory 
authorities. To date there are very few studies investigating the resignations of CEOs 
with financial wrongdoings and none that differentiate between timely versus delayed 
resignations. Our results show significant negative abnormal returns following 
announcement of CEO resignations. In addition, compared to timely resignations, the 
negative stock market reaction is larger and longer lasting for delayed resignations. 
This suggests that CEO resignations due to financial wrongdoings are not perceived 
as good news by investors, and the delayed resignations could make investors lose 
more confidence possibly because of worries about the ineffective corporate 
governance and supervision mechanism. Using a hand-collected dataset, this paper 
examines what factors may potentially influence the timeliness of CEO resignations 
and finds a significant negative correlation between CEO-chairman duality and the 
timeliness of CEO resignations. Moreover, this paper investigates the time-series 
patterns and within-firm differences in performance for up to three years around CEO 
resignations. Our results suggest a significant drop in the market-to-book ratio upon 
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CEO turnovers are significant strategic events for companies. Seen from a 
corporate resources-based view, the CEO managerial capability and his/her 
entrepreneurship are important strategic resources which could determine the 
enterprise growth and performance to a large extent. Therefore, the study of CEO 
turnover has already aroused widespread interest in academic research. 
The turnovers of CEO may be the result of forced replacements or voluntary 
resignations, and could be because of many different reasons, such as normal 
retirement, death or illness, a company reorganization, poor performance, or the 
pursuit of another career (Denis and Denis, 1995; Khurana and Nohria, 2000). Many 
prior studies have suggested that CEO resignations should have an influence on a 
company; when the announcement of CEO resignation is released to the public, the 
abnormal returns would be observed on the stock market (Furtado and Rozeff, 1987; 
Beatty and Zajac, 1987; Weisbach, 1988; Lubatkin et al., 1989; Bonnier and Bruner, 
1989; Davidson et al., 1990). Moreover, the direction and magnitude of those stock 
prices fluctuations may differ for varied types of management changes (Mahajan and 
Lummer, 1993). In addition, it is widely accepted in academia that some potential 
factors exist to influence the probability of CEO turnovers, such as the board of 
directors, CEO characteristics, company performance, etc. (Weisbach, 1988; Morck et 
al., 1988; Finkelstein et al., 1990; Jensen, 1993; Yermack, 1996; Renneboog, 2000; 
Defond and Hung, 2004). Moreover, there are many studies that examine the impact 
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of the succession by a new CEO on company performance. It is believed that, 
differences exist in firm performance for different kinds of CEO resignations and 
successions (Furtado and Rozeff, 1987; Kang and Shivdasani, 1995; Huson et al. 
2004). 
News reports in recent years suggest that financial wrongdoings have become an 
important reason why CEOs resign from companies. Bob Diamond, CEO of Barclays, 
resigned due to manipulation of LIBOR; Kenichi Watanabe, CEO of NOMURA 
Securities, resigned because of insider trading; Oswald J. Grübel, CEO of UBS 
resigned because of unauthorized financial transactions. There are two scenarios that 
lead to the resignations of CEOs due to financial wrongdoings. Under the first 
scenario, the wrongdoing is found via a company internal probe or investigation; 
under the second scenario, the wrongdoing is uncovered by an outside authority, 
mainly the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and either the CEO 
himself/herself has to resign under public pressure. To the best of our knowledge, 
there are very few studies that provide a focused investigation of CEO resignations 
due to financial wrongdoings, and very few use a classification of these two scenarios 
into studies of CEO resignations, so I empirically investigate these two types of 
resignations in this thesis. 
We examine whether CEO resignations due to financial wrongdoings are 
proactively pushed by board of directors or driven by investigations initiated by the 
SEC or other regulatory authorities. Firstly, we explore whether the stock market 
reacts differently to timely and delayed actions by performing both short- and 
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long-term event study and examining the differences in abnormal returns. Second, we 
examine whether certain factors potentially influence the timeliness of CEO’s 
resignations. Plus, this paper analyzes the within-firm variations in performance to see 
whether company performance changes around timely and delayed CEO resignations. 
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first study that investigates the timeliness of 
CEO resignations in connection with financial wrongdoings. 
The remainder of this study is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the 
relevant literature about CEO turnovers and company performance. Section 3 
describes the data used in the paper. Section 4 introduces the applied methodologies 
and models. Section 5 reports and interprets the empirical results. Section 6 concludes 
this paper with a summary and a brief discussion and provides suggestions for future 
research in this area. 
2. Literature Review 
2.1 Impact of CEO Turnover on a Firm’s Stock Price Performance 
It is widely accepted that, upon announcement of CEO turnover, a firm’s stock 
price is significantly impacted; yet, the existing literature has not arrived at an 
agreement about the direction of the impact. For example, Davidson et al. (1990) 
investigate 367 CEO change announcements in Fortune 500 companies and observe a 
positive stock market reaction. Other academic studies also find significant positive 
cumulative excess return around CEO change announcements (Bonnier and Bruner, 
1989; Furtado and Rozeff, 1987; Weisbach, 1988). In contrast, some studies predict 
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that CEO changes exert a negative influence on the stock market (Beatty and Zajac, 
1987). Such negative cumulative excess returns have been documented, for instance, 
by Furtado (1986). Finally, several studies find no significant correlation between 
CEO turnovers and cumulative excess returns (Borstadt, 1985; Klein, Kim and 
Mahajan, 1985; Reinganum, 1985). 
These inconsistent research findings suggest that the impact exerted on the stock 
market by CEO change are not always the same; it is thus important to investigate this 
problem by introducing more classification conditions, such as whether the CEO 
change action is a timely or delayed one. Mahajan and Lummer (1993) note that the 
direction and magnitude of changes in stock prices results from the announcement of 
various types of management changes; and compared with resignations due to internal 
reasons, resignations driven by external reasons could lead to larger abnormal average 
stock returns. 
2.2 Factors Influencing the Probability of CEO Turnover  
There have been several studies that investigate the directional relationship 
between the potential influencing factors and the probability of CEO turnovers. Based 
on the research results achieved until now, recent empirical studies mainly focus on 
the following influencing factors, namely CEO-chairman duality, management 
compensation, the board size, the proportion of independent directors, the CEO’s 
tenure, the company’s size and the company’s performance. 
As for CEO-chairman duality, the contemporary corporate governance structure 
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theory believes that, if the positions of chair and CEO are held by one person, it is 
difficult to guarantee the independence of the board; stated in another way, the board 
cannot effectively perform its function to evaluate and replace the CEO if necessary. 
For instance, Dalton and Kesner (1987) and Pi and Timme (1993) both consider that 
boards controlled by management cannot fulfill their statutory functions of 
governance; in order to prevent the moral hazard and adverse selection of agents, the 
monitoring function of the board must be strengthened and the duties of management 
and chair have to be separated. Therefore, the extant literature agrees that the 
existence of duality is negatively related to the probability of CEO replacement. 
Goyal and Park (2000) examine 455 companies with CEO turnover occurring during 
the period of 1992-1996 and 823 companies without CEO turnovers occurring within 
the same period as the control group, and empirically verify that, the sensitivity of 
CEO turnovers towards poor performance is much weaker for companies with 
CEO-chairman duality. Based on a sample of 351 companies listed in Belgium from 
1989 to 1994, Renneboog (2000) also confirms that it is much easier for CEO 
turnovers to occur for companies without duality. In addition, Chakraborty and Sheikh 
(2008) point out that the CEOs who also act as the chairman of the board or belong to 
a founding family face a lower likelihood of performance-related turnovers. Moreover, 
Plian (1995) applies the social network theory and finds that, the CEO’s personal 
prestige and the existence of duality reduce the probability of a CEO being dismissed 
from office. 
As for the CEO’s compensation, it is often considered an important reflection of 
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the CEO’s power within the company. Hermalin and Weisbach (1998) argue that, as 
the CEO’s power relative to the board increases, the efficiency of the board will 
decline. Arrow (1962) suggests a learning by doing view, asserting that executives 
with large power can accumulate and control the business-critical resources, which 
strengthens the executives’ irreplaceability and increases the dismissal cost. 
Furthermore, Finkelstein (1992) suggests that managerial power will be reflected on 
his/her ability to influence the compensation decisions made by the board and 
remuneration committee. Fahlenbrach (2009) finds that the executives’ power 
significantly increases their compensation amount. Boyd (1994), Conyon (1997) and 
Bebchuk et al. (2002) agree that managerial power exerts a very important influence 
on improving executive compensation. Therefore, it can be assumed that the higher 
the CEO’s compensation, the higher his/her power, and the lower the likelihood of 
turnover. 
As to the relationship between tenure and the probability of turnovers, there are 
two broadly accepted hypotheses. The first is the entrenchment hypothesis proposed 
by Morck et al. (1988). The managerial entrenchment hypothesis suggests that the 
social networks of executives grow broader over time, which provides some 
resistance against outside pressures, thereby reducing the probability of executives 
being replaced. The second is the learning hypothesis proposed by Gibbons and 
Murphy (1992). The learning hypothesis suggests that a new CEO first takes office, 
the board only has little information about the CEO’s true capacity; therefore, the 
board has a relatively high degree of tolerance for the expected performance of the 
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CEO. As the board learns more and more about the CEO, this tolerance decreases and 
the CEO’s performance that was acceptable before may be not acceptable right now. 
In Gibbons’ and Murphy’s (1992) words, the variance of expected performance 
decreases and the likelihood of CEO turnover increases with CEO tenure. 
With respect to board size, the majority of scholars agree that, it is easier for 
smaller boards to dismiss the CEOs with inferior performance. This is because small 
boards not only allow board members to discuss important issues in more detail, but 
are also more conducive to internal communications and exchanges, which help form 
a more cohesive board. Yermack (1996) collects a sample of 452 Fortune 500 
companies and finds that when a company encounters poor performance, small boards 
are more inclined to dismiss their CEO. The threat of dismissal declines when board 
size increases. Chakraborty and Sheikh (2008) also find a positive correlation between 
the smaller boards and the probability of CEO turnover. Lipton and Lorsch (1992) and 
Jensen (1993) suggest that boards should be appropriately small and preferably 
consist of 8 to 9 members. They explain that before reaching the proper size, the 
supervision effectiveness may be enhanced with an increase in the number of board 
members; however, when boards go beyond their recommended size, an increase in 
the number of board members may cause problems such as inefficient decision 
making, less time for discussions of management performance, increasrd risk aversion 
and so on. 
With respect to the proportion of independent directors, prior research has 
documented that boards that are dominated by inside directors are lacking 
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independence. When the company’s CEO acts as a board member, independence will 
be reduced even further. In contrast, unlike inside directors, outside directors (also 
known as independent directors) are not directly influenced and constrained by either 
the controlling shareholders or the company management, so they are able to exercise 
independent judgment towards the company operating situations, thereby improving 
the effectiveness of board supervision. Therefore, when a company experiences poor 
performance or when the CEO has done something wrong, it is easier for independent 
directors to make decisions about CEO replacement. In addition, the human capital 
value and professional reputation of the independent directors are closely related to 
the company’s performance. If an independent director does not take the initiative to 
challenge an executives’ misbehavior which results in a decline in corporate 
performance or even a takeover of the company, he/she will suffer from damaged 
reputation and a depreciated human capital value, which will endanger both his/her 
compensation and even their employment career. In order to preserve and even 
increase the value of their own human capital, independent directors thus have 
sufficient motivation to monitor managers. Prior research generally suggests a 
positive relationship between independent directors and the probability of misbehaved 
or incapable CEOs being replaced. Based on a sample of 367 U.S. companies in the 
Forbes 500, Weisbach (1988) shows that it is more likely for outside independent 
directors to replace underperforming CEOs. Kaplan (1994), Kang and Shivdasani 
(1995), and Denis (1997) also confirm the positive relationship between the 




With respect to company size, prior research indicates that the larger the 
company size, the more dispersed its ownership structure; thus the more difficult it is 
to obtain sufficient votes on the board to dismiss the CEO. Also, the larger the 
company, the higher the requirements for the new CEO successor’s knowledge and 
experience to run the company; thus the more difficult it is to find a suitable candidate 
to replace the incumbent CEO. Therefore, it is often argued that company size is 
negatively correlated with the probability of CEO turnover, which is empirically 
confirmed by, e.g. Finkelstein et al. (1990). 
As to company performance, it is an important factor that may influence the 
probability of CEO turnover. As the company’s highest level decision maker, the CEO 
shoulders the responsibility towards the company’s operating results and 
organizational strategic design. Thus, the board of directors will evaluate the CEO’s 
managerial capabilities and professional conduct mainly through the company’s 
performance and the market value of the business. When there is a decline in 
corporate performance, the board will often believe that it is the CEO who fails to 
allocate corporate resources efficiently and effectively, and may advocate the 
replacement of the incumbent CEO. That is to say, the worse the company 
performance, the more likely the CEO will be dismissed. As a matter of fact, this kind 
of negative correlation between the likelihood of CEO turnover and company 
performance has been documented by a large body of empirical research. Defond and 
Hung (2004) use CEO turnover data across 33 countries from 1997 to 2001 and 
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analyze the correlation between performance and the probability of CEO turnovers 
under various legal environments. They conclude that the probability of CEO turnover 
is negatively correlated with company performance. Kato and Long (2006) 
investigates the relationship between CEO turnovers and corporate performance in 
Chinese firms and find that, there exists a significant negative correlation between the 
probability of CEO turnover and either the accounting performance or the market 
performance in the previous year. Similarly, Kaplan (1994) considers 119 Japanese 
companies within the list of Fortune 500 firms from 1980 to 1988 and concludes that 
for the Japanese companies, the possibility of top executive turnover is significantly 
negatively correlated with the company’s stock returns and income levels. In the same 
vein, based on a sample of companies listed on the Tokyo Stock Exchange, Abe (1997) 
finds a significant negative correlation between CEO turnover and a company’s 
long-term performance. Finally, Puffer and Weintrop (1991) find that CEO turnovers 
are more likely to occur when reported annual earnings per share fall short of 
expectations. 
2.3 Influence of CEO Turnovers on Company Performance 
As one of the company’s most important policy makers, managers and 
controllers, a CEO’s expertise and managerial skills are regarded as significant 
strategic resources for the company’s sustained healthy development. Therefore, it is 
highly likely that a CEO’s resignation and succession could exert a direct impact on 
the company’s operating performance. As a matter of fact, many different points of 
view exist as to the influence of CEO turnover on corporate performance. 
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The succession adaption view suggests that CEO successions have a positive 
influence on corporate performance. This view holds that the board of directors tends 
to replace CEOs who have little expertise or whose skills do not match with the 
company’s requirements. As such, the CEO replacement will be implemented as a 
method to adapt to the company’s dynamic operating environment. It is also plausible 
that the company needs to make strategic adjustments and the former CEO’s abilities 
do not satisfy the needs of the new development strategy. Therefore, under the 
succession adaption view, a CEO’s succession should result in an improvement in 
corporate performance (Guest, 1962; Helmich, 1974; Singh et al., 1986; Virany et al., 
1992). Under that hypothesis, we assume that the new executive should be able and 
shall have the enthusiasm to resolve the company’s difficulties, thus an appropriate 
CEO succession could be an important way to enable an organization to become 
better attuned to the new organizational demands and thus lead to an improvement in 
performance (Kaplan, 1994; Denis, 1995; Kang and Shivdasani 1995; Farrell and 
Whidbee, 2000; Khurana, 2000). Weisbach (1988) and Bonnier and Bruner (1989) use 
event study methodology and document a positive reaction to CEO replacements in 
the stock market. Also, Huson (2004) finds a positive correlation between the 
abnormal returns of stocks and CEO turnover announcements. Compared with the 
year before the change in CEOs, total assets to sales and operating return to sales 
show a significant improvement in the third year after the CEO replacement. 
Another theory is the vicious-circle view, which was proposed by Grusky (1963). 
It suggests that CEO turnovers may exert a negative impact on corporate performance 
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because the CEO replacement will likely result in an adjustment of the firm’s 
corporate organizational structure, a change in corporate strategy and a change in staff 
personnel, thus disrupting and interrupting to the firm’s organizational operations. 
This may lead to employee conflicts and low morale, eventually diminishing the 
company’s performance (Allen et al., 1979; Carroll, 1984; Beatty and Zajac, 1987; 
Haveman, 1993). What’s worse, a vicious circle may occur; the poor performance 
may lead to another CEO succession, which in turn disrupts the operations again and 
further worsens corporate performance. Therefore, frequent CEO successions are 
unfavorable for company performance. 
Thirdly, Gamson and Scotch (1964) propose the scapegoating hypothesis. This 
hypothesis suggests no relationship between CEO succession and company 
performance because when the company experiences poor performance, the 
incumbent CEO will be treated as a scapegoat and will be replaced. As such, the CEO 
succession is a purely symbolic action aimed to send a signal to the outside that the 
organization is changing something in order to improve its performance. However, the 
succession is merely a ritual and will not substantially improve corporate performance. 
Zajac (1990) investigates 118 CEO turnovers and points out that CEO succession has 
nothing to do with corporate performance. Similarly, Reinganum (1985) and Warner 
et al. (1988) perform event studies and find that CEO successions do not have any 
significant impact on the firm’s stock price. Eitzen and Yetman (1972), Lieberson and 
O’Connor (1972), Salancik and Pfeffer (1980), Friendman and Singh (1989) and 
McGuire et al. (1998) are all in favor of this view. 
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Fourthly is the conditional view, which suggests that it is not simple to judge 
whether or not a CEO succession has an impact on company performance, and argues 
that other factors need to be considered. For example, Denis and Denis (1995) classify 
CEO turnovers as normal retirements and forced resignations, and use the operating 
income on assets as proxy for company performance. They find that for forced 
resignations, the company performance deteriorates before the CEO turnover and 
shows a significant improvement after 2 years; yet, they observe little change in 
performance before normal retirements and only a slight improvement afterwards. 
Leker and Salomo (2000) also consider varied reasons for CEO turnover and observe 
that the post-transition performance during the succession period is different. Gibson 
(2003) suggests that emerging market mechanisms need to be considered, and finds 
no significant relationship between CEO turnovers and company performance based 
on stock market returns, yet a strong association between CEO turnovers and 
company performance based on earnings. In summary, the conditional view implies 
that the influence of CEO turnovers on company performance differs when taking 
some other potential influencing factors into consideration. 
3. Hypotheses 
Intuitively, announcements of CEO resignations due to financial wrongdoings 
should be considered bad news. The departure of a CEO will involve uncertainty 
about the company’s operations. In addition, it may raise investor concerns about the 
potential damages caused by the CEO’s misbehavior. As noted earlier, for timely CEO 
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resignations, the CEO’s financial wrongdoings are typically uncovered through 
internal investigations, whereas for delayed CEO resignations, the wrongdoings are 
uncovered by outsiders. Mahajan and Lummer (1993) find that the direction and 
magnitude of the stock market reaction to CEO turnovers differ based on the type of 
management change. Therefore, it is reasonable to assume that: 
Hypothesis 1: Upon the announcement of a CEO resignation due to financial 
wrongdoing, the firm experiences a negative abnormal return. The abnormal return 
differs between timely and delayed resignations. 
Whether the CEOs’ financial wrongdoings can be proactively discovered by the 
company’s board depends on the effectiveness of the board. If the board has more 
effective governance and stronger monitoring mechanisms, it is more likely for the 
CEOs financial wrongdoings to be discovered internally. If the positions of board 
chairman and CEO are held by the same person, if the board has too many or too few 
directors, or if the board has too few independent directors, the board’s governance 
function will be reduced. Similarly, if the CEO has too much power, which could be 
reflected by his/her compensation or tenure, he/she may influence the board’s decision 
making. Therefore, we assume that: 
Hypothesis 2: In firms with CEO-chairman duality, a higher level of CEO 
compensation, longer CEO tenure, or a higher proportion of independent directors on 
the board, the lower the probability that the CEO resigns on a timely basis if he/she is 
involved in financial wrongdoings. 
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Under the vicious-circle view, CEO resignations due to financial wrongdoings 
constitute abnormal management changes, which could cause large changes in the 
firm’s managerial structure and personnel, or even interrupt the company’s existing 
operations and strategies. Under the conditional view, the timeliness of a CEO’s 
resignation is a reflection of differences in board structure and governance 
effectiveness and may cause different investors’ reactions. Thus, differences in the 
timeliness of CEO resignations need to be taken into account when examining 
changes in the corporate performance. Therefore, we hypothesize that: 
Hypothesis 3: Company performance declines after CEO resignations. In 
addition, we expect that corporate performance changes differ between companies 
with timely actions and companies with delayed actions. 
4. Data 
This thesis employs a sample of publicly traded U.S. companies in which CEOs 
resigned in connection with financial wrongdoings during the period from January 
1996 to December 2007. 
We classify CEO resignations based on timely vs. delayed board actions. 
Specifically, we distinguish between timely and delayed board actions by comparing 
the CEO resignation dates and the public dates when information about the CEO’s 
financial wrongdoings was released to public by regulatory authorities such as the U.S. 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), the Federal Bureau of Investigations 
(FBI), or the Internal Revenue Service (IRS). When a CEO resigns after his/her 
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financial wrongdoings have already been released to the public, we consider the 
resignation a delayed action; if the CEO resigns ahead of the public news release, it is 
considered a timely action. 
Our initial sample consists of 112 publicly listed U.S. companies in which CEOs 
were accused of financial wrongdoings and resigned during our sample period. After 
excluding companies without public date information, our final sample comprises 95 
companies in which CEOs resigned in connection with financial wrongdoings. 
To exam whether and how investors react to the announcement of a CEO’s 
resignation, we collect company identifiers from Wharton Research Data Services 
(WRDS) for our sample firms and then run an event study using Eventus.  
In addition, we manually collect data on company characteristics as well as 
accounting-related data. Specifically, to investigate the influence of board and CEO 
characteristics on the firm’s pre- and post- resignation performance, we collect 
information on CEO-chairman duality, compensation, board size, independent 
directors, the number of years of experience the CEO has within the firm and the new 
CEO’s origin from Execucomp and SEC proxy statements. In terms of 
accounting-related data, we collect information on total assets, the market value of 
equity, the operating return on assets (OROA), and Tobin’s Q from Compustat. 
Specifically, we retrieve data on total assets (Compustat item AT), the book value of 
equity (Compustat item CEQ), the market value of equity (Compustat item MKVALT) 
and operating income before depreciation (Compustat item OIBDP). The OROA is 




To investigate the within-firm variation in performance, we follow 
Pérez-González (2006) and manually collect data and calculate the operating return 
on assets (OROA), and the market-to-book ratio (MTB) for a period from 3 years 
before the CEO’s resignation to 3 years after the resignation from Compustat and 
CRSP. Specifically, we collect information on the firms’ total assets (Compustat item 
AT), total liabilities (Compustat item LT), net income/loss (Compustat item NI), book 
value of equity (Compustat item CEQ), market value of equity (Compustat item 
MKVALT), operating income before depreciation (Compustat item OIBDP), and book 
value of deferred taxes (Compustat item TXDB). The MTB ratio is defined as the 
ratio of the sum of the book value of assets plus the market value of equity minus the 




To control for different industry trends or mean-reversion from a firm’s 
pre-transition performance (Barber and Lyon, 1996), we adjust our performance 
measures by using industry matched benchmarks. Specifically, we create industry 
controls by subtracting the median performance of all firms in the same industry from 
each company’s performance measure. Industries are classified by using the Fama 
French industry classification system, which distinguishes between 48 industry 
sectors and can be found on Kenneth R. French’s Data Library Website.2  
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5.1 Event Study 
Event study methodology is applied to study the announcement effect of a CEO 
resignation on a company’s stock returns. Event studies are typically used to conduct 
empirical analyses to explore the correlation between securities prices and a particular 
event, such as the announcement of a management change, stock repurchase, dividend 
payout, etc. Generally, there are three assumptions implied in an event study: the 
market is efficient, the event is not expected, and there are no other events in the event 
window. If the particular event is significant, the volatility of the company’s stock 
price will differ from its normal performance when no such event occurs; thus 
abnormal returns will be generated. The main purpose of an event study is to 
capitalize statistical methods to test the status of abnormal returns to examine whether 
the event affects the company’s share price and if so, what kind of influence it is. In 
our event study, we choose the date of the CEO’s resignation as the announcement 
date. If the announcement date coincides with a non-trading day or with a holiday, we 
use the first subsequent trading date.  
We conduct a short-term event study that examines a firm’s daily abnormal 
returns and uses the market model to estimate the stock’s expected return. The market 
model assumes a linear relationship between the stock return and the return on the 
market portfolio. 
For each company i, the expected return     is given by: 
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where          ,             
  and    
       
           
     is the return on the market portfolio, usually a broad-based stock index is 
used as the market portfolio.   and   are estimated by performing an ordinary least 
squares regression of the data in the estimation window. 
We calculate individual daily abnormal returns      by subtracting the stock’s 
expected return from the stock’s actual return        : 
                 
The sample portfolio average abnormal return for a certain day is the arithmetic 
mean of the daily abnormal returns for all sample stocks on that day: 
     
     
 
   
 
 
The sample portfolio cumulative average abnormal return (CAAR) for time (-j,k) 
is: 
                
 




      
   
    
 
   
 
We also conduct a long-term event study by using both the buy-and-hold 
abnormal return (BHAR) approach and Jensen’s alpha approach to investigate 
monthly abnormal returns. A firm’s buy-and-hold return (BH) is the return that an 
investor earns by buying and holding a stock for a long period of time. The 
buy-and-hold abnormal return (BHAR) is the difference between the buy-and-hold 
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return of a sample firm and its expected buy-and-hold return usually based on a 
benchmark portfolio. For example, the market adjusted buy-and-hold abnormal return 
uses the market return as the benchmark. BHARs are calculated as follows: 
              
 
   
            
 
   
 
where     is the buy-and-hold return for company stock i in month t;        is 
the expected buy-and-hold return for stock i or the buy-and-hold return of the 
benchmark portfolio in month t. By that analogy, the calculation of market-adjusted 
BHAR can be expressed as follows: 
              
 
   
          
 
   
 
where     is the buy-and-hold return for company i in month t and     is the 
market buy-and-hold return in month t. The main difference between CARs and 
BHARs is that CARs do not take the compounding effect into account. Barber and 
Lyon (1997) advocate using BHARs to measure long-term abnormal returns because 
they better resemble investors’ investment behaviors. 
Finally, Jensen’s alpha approach, also known as the calendar time approach, is 
expressed as: 
                                                   
where     is the equally or value weighted return for calendar month t for the 
portfolio of event firms that experienced the event within the previous T months;     
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is the risk-free rate;     is the return on the CRSP value-weight market portfolio; 
      is the difference between the return on the portfolio of small and large sized 
firms stocks;       is the difference between the return on the portfolio of high and 
low book-to-market stocks;       is the difference between the return on the 
portfolio of winner and loser stocks during the previous 12 months; and    is the 
average monthly abnormal return, that is, the Jensen’s alpha, on the portfolio of event 
firms over the T-month post-event period;   ,   ,    and    are sensitivities, that 
is betas, of the event portfolio to the four factors. It is often thought that Jensen’s 
alpha approach is more likely to obtain results consistent with market efficiency as the 
returns are weighted equally by each period rather than by firm. 
5.2 Logistic Regression 
A logistic regression is applied to examine whether some factors potentially 
cause the boards to fire the CEO in a timely manner or not. Logistic regressions, also 
known as logit models, are one important method used for prediction. Because the 
dependent variable in our study is a dummy variable that identifies whether the CEO 
resignation is a timely or delayed action, thus the binary logistic regression model is 
used to analyze the relationship between the dependent binary variable and the 
independent variables. The logistic regression model is specified as follows: 
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where TIMELY is a dummy variable which equals one when the CEO resignation 
is a timely action and zero when it is a delayed action. As explained in the literature 
review above, we include DUAL, LOGCOMP, WITHFIRM, BDSIZE, and 
INDEPROP in the logistic regression as the independent variables, SIZE t=-1, 
MVEQUITYt=-1 and OROAt=-1 as the controlled variables. DUAL is a dummy variable 
that equals one when the positions of CEO and chair are held by the same person, i.e. 
duality exists, and zero otherwise.         is the natural logarithm of the 
resigning CEO’s compensation. WITHFIRM represents the experience (measured in 
number of years) the resigning CEO has with the firm. BDSIZE is the number of 
board members on the board. INDEPROP is the proportion of the number of 
independent directors on the board. SIZE t=-1, MVEQUITYt=-1 and OROAt=-1 denote the 
natural logarithm of the firm’s total assets, the market value of equity and the 
operating return on assets one year before the CEO’s resignation. 
5.3 Ordinary Least Squares Regression 
An ordinary least squares (OLS) regression is applied to investigate whether 
certain corporate characteristics factors may drive the short-term abnormal returns. 
Our OLS regression model is specified as follows: 
                                                     
                                  
where CAR(i,j) represents the cumulative abnormal returns during different 
short-term periods. DELAYED is a dummy variable which equals one when the CEO 
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resignation is delayed and zero when it is timely. DUAL is a dummy variable that 
equals one when the positions of CEO and chair are held by the same person, i.e. 
duality exists, and zero otherwise. Because the delayed resignation dummy and the 
CEO-chairman duality dummy could interact, we include an interaction term of these 
two variables in the OLS regression. LOGCOMP, WITHFIRM, BDSIZE and 
INDEPROP have similar interpretations as in the logistic regression. 
5.4 Within-Firm Variation in Performance 
This paper closely follows the methodology applied in Pérez-González (2006) to 
examine the within-firm variation in performance. Pérez-González (2006) notes that 
when concentrating on differences in within-firm performance, one does not need to 
control for time-invariant company characteristics that may jointly affect a company’s 
prospects and its decision to appoint a new CEO. The performance measures we use 
include the operating return on assets (OROA), and the firm’s market-to-book ratio 
(MTB). Also, comparable to Pérez-González (2006), we adjust our performance 
variables using industry-matched benchmarks to control for potential industry trends 
and mean-reversion. 
6. Empirical Results 
6.1 Sample Characteristics 
Table 1 reports yearly sample frequencies based on the CEO’s resignation year. 
Our statistics show that CEO resignations due to financial wrongdoings occurred 
more frequently towards the end of our sample period (i.e. after 2002) than at the 
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beginning. These observations may be explained as follows. With the outburst of the 
Enron scandal in December 2001 and the Worldcom scandal in June 2002, the US 
compliance and regulatory institutions have greatly increased the supervision towards 
publicly listed companies, and released the Sarbanes-Oxley Act in 2002. The 
responsibilities shouldered by company executives and public audits have been 
greatly strengthened and made much more explicit, therefore, it would be easier to 
reveal the CEOs involved with financial wrongdoings. Table 2 provides summary 
statistics based on the industry distribution of our sample firms. The table shows that 
business services is the sector with the highest frequency of CEO resignations due to 
financial wrongdoings from 1996 to 2007. One possible reason could be that the 
business services sector is made up of companies that primarily earn revenue through 
providing intangible products and services, which could leave more room for 
managerial discretion and manipulation. Therefore, it is no surprise that the business 
services sector has the highest frequency of such CEO resignations. 
Table 3 provides the summary statistics on the firm characteristics of our sample 
firms. Panel A focuses on information before CEO resignations, while Panel B 
provides information after CEO resignations. We observe that the means of 
CEO-chairman duality between timely subsample and delayed subsample before CEO 
resignation are different at the 0.01 significant level; but the difference of means 
between timely and delayed after CEO resignation is not significant any more. Also, 
the means of CEO-chairman duality, for both whole sample and delayed resignation 
sample, between before CEO resignation and after CEO resignation are different at 
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the 0.01 significant level. Therefore, we could say that after CEOs resign for financial 
wrongdoings, companies, especially those with delayed actions, reduce significantly 
CEO-chairman duality. Also, in both the timely and delayed subsamples, after a CEO 
resigns, the company reduces CEO compensation, and the gap between companies 
with timely or delayed actions has been greatly bridged confirmed by the change in 
significance level for difference. In 39 percent of all sample companies, new CEOs 
are promoted from within; for timely companies, the percentage is 50 and for delayed 
companies, the percentage is 35. This implies that CEOs resign for financial 
wrongdoings, companies undertake more outside appointments than inside 
appointments, especially so in the companies with delayed resignations. The board 
size and proportion of independent director characteristics before turnovers are quite 
similar to those afterwards. Finally, we observe that CEOs who resigned in a delayed 
manner tend to have worked for the firm longer than CEOs who resigned in a timely 
manner. 
6.2 Short-term Event Study 
This paper uses both the CRSP equally weighted market index and the S&P 500 
index as a benchmark when calculating abnormal returns for the short term event 
study. Daily abnormal returns are calculated for a period of 61 days during the event 
window and are aggregated into cumulative average abnormal returns to test the 
cumulative effects of resignation announcements. Table 4 shows that in both the 
whole sample as well as the timely and delayed sub samples, the average abnormal 
returns around the announcement of a CEO resignation (CAAR (0, 0), (-1, 1), (-1, 3) 
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and (-3, 3)) are all significantly negative. Figure 1 to 4 clearly show that stock prices 
experience a sharp decline following the announcement of both timely and delayed 
CEO resignations. Not surprisingly, this implies that stock market investors react 
adversely towards CEO resignations. Furthermore, in all short-term event periods, the 
abnormal return is more negative for delayed than for timely resignations. Even 
though the mean differences for the periods (0, 0), (-1, 3) and (-3, 3) are not 
statistically significant, they are economically significant in all periods. In addition, 
they are statistically significant during the period (-3, 3). Using a 90% and 80% 
Winsorization to limit the presence of extreme values, the significance of the mean 
differences between timely and delayed resignations increases and becomes 
statistically significant during the periods (-1, 3) and (-3, 3). When performing a 
Wilcoxon test between timely and delayed resignations, the median differences are 
significant for the periods (0, 0), (-1, 3) and (-3, 3). This may imply that the 
announcement of a delayed CEO resignation leads to a stronger negative market 
reaction than a timely one. In addition, the graph implies that delayed CEO 
resignations lead to a longer lasting negative stock market reaction. 
When a CEO resigns in a timely fashion, investors will learn for the first time 
that the CEO has done something wrong. This may raise shareholders’ concerns that 
their own interests may have been violated, thereby causing damage to the 
stockholders’ confidence in the company. Therefore, it is reasonable to assume that 
investors regard CEO resignations, even if they are timely, as a negative market signal. 
For delayed CEO resignations, although shareholders already know that the CEO has 
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engaged in financial wrongdoings through public announcements; the firm admitted 
the misbehavior only passively. Because the misbehavior had to be disclosed by the 
authorities, investors are likely to be concerned about the company’s ineffective 
corporate governance and supervision mechanisms. Therefore, it is natural that the 
investors react adversely to the announcement of delayed CEO resignations. 
In summary, the shareholders react negatively to the CEO resignations because 
of both the misbehavior of the former CEO and associated risk of legal claims and the 
future operational uncertainty for the firm. In addition, for delayed resignations, 
shareholders are also likely to be concerned about the company’s ineffective corporate 
governance and monitoring functions. Investors may worry that there could be 
additional problems in the firm that have not yet been revealed because the 
monitoring is so poor. This could be the reason for larger and longer lasting negative 
market reaction in response to delayed CEO resignations. 
6.3 Long-term Event Study 
To test the long-term stock price reaction to the announcement of a CEO 
resignation, this paper employs a buy-and-hold abnormal return approach. Our results 
in Table 5 show that the negative abnormal returns for the whole sample have become 
less significant gradually over time. Even though the mean differences in cumulative 
abnormal returns between timely and delayed companies are not statistically 
significant; yet the median differences are statistically significant, and it is clear that 
for timely CEO resignations, the negative market reaction becomes insignificant about 
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one month after the announcement, while it is significant for delayed CEO 
resignations even two years after the announcement. 
We also use the Jensen’s alpha approach which provides results that are similar to 
the BHAR approach. Our results in Table 6 suggest that for timely CEO resignations, 
the abnormal returns become insignificant after about 6 months following the 
announcement, whereas they are significant for delayed CEO resignations well 
beyond that date. 
This may be because, even though timely CEO resignations have a negative 
impact on investor confidence, the company’s active investigations and disclosures 
somewhat save its corporate image. For delayed CEO resignations, besides the CEO’s 
misbehavior, the investors probably also question the company’s corporate 
governance and monitoring mechanisms, which may damage the corporate image and 
shareholders’ confidence. 
6.4 Logistic Regression of Factors on the Timeliness of CEO Resignations 
Before running a regression, it is necessary to establish a Pearson correlation 
matrix to rule out any potential multicollinearity problems among our independent 
variables. Table 7 displays the pairwise correlations between our variables. As can be 
seen from the matrix, all correlation coefficients are within an acceptable range. Next, 
we estimate the logistic regression described in our methodology section, as well as 
other logistic regressions in which we use subsets of the variables. Our logistic 
regression results in Table 8 show that for certain regressions, the CEO-chairman 
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duality is significantly negatively related to the timeliness of CEO resignations. This 
suggests that companies in which the positions of CEO and board chairman are held 
by the same person, it is more likely that the CEO resignation due to financial 
wrongdoings is delayed. 
6.5 OLS Regression of Factors Driving Short-term Abnormal Returns 
Based on the pairwise correlation matrix in Table 9, there should be no 
multicollinearity problem with the variables in the OLS regression. Our OLS 
regression results in Table 10 show no significant relationship between our regressor 
factors and different short-term cumulative abnormal returns. One possible reason 
could be that because we are lacking sufficient data for some variables, the sample 
size for our OLS regression is quite small; a larger sample size in further research 
may resolve this issue. 
6.6 Within-Firm Variation in Performance 
Figures 7 to 10 depict trends in the median unadjusted and industry-adjusted 
operating return on assets for our sample companies. The graphs show that both after 
timely and delayed resignations operating performance drops in the year after the 
CEO resignation, and recovers gradually afterwards. Yet, even three years after CEO 
resignations company performance, in general, does not fully recover and remains 
below the performance level three years before the CEO resignation. Furthermore it 
appears that companies with delayed resignations outperform companies with timely 
resignations. To further investigate here, Table 11 depicts the prior performance of 
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timely versus delayed companies from three years before to one year before CEO 
resignations. It is confirmed that for nearly all of the time, the delayed companies 
outperform before the CEO resignations. Therefore, for delayed companies, it is 
possible those boards may be hesitant to fire the misbehaved CEOs just because of 
their good performance. 
Table 12 presents the mean differences in company performance during a period 
of three years before and after CEO transitions. Our results suggest that our sample 
companies suffer a performance decline after CEO resignations. Specifically, the 
companies undergo an average decline in their industry-adjusted market-to-book ratio 
of 62.37 percent during a three-year period following the announcement, which is 
significant at the five percent level. For companies with timely action, we observe no 
significance decline. However for companies with delayed resignations, we observe a 
65.95 percent decline in the industry-adjusted market-to-book ratio over the 
three-year post-transition, which is significant at the five percent level. This suggests 
that, in general, resignations of CEOs who are accused of financial wrongdoings exert 
a negative influence on company performance, and that the adverse impact is more 
pronounced for the delayed CEO resignations. 
7. Conclusions and Discussion 
This paper aims to examine changes in company performance around CEO 
resignations in connection with financial wrongdoings and differentiates between two 
types of CEO resignations, i.e. timely and delayed actions, to test whether the 
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performance changes differ between these two actions. To examine the market 
reaction to CEO resignations, we conduct both short-term and long-term event studies. 
In addition, we run a logistic regression to examine whether certain company 
characteristics influence the timeliness of resignations and an ordinary least squares 
regression to investigate whether certain factors may drive the short-term cumulative 
abnormal returns. Following Pérez-González (2006), we employ performance 
measures to analyze the within-firm variation in performance during a period from 
three years before to three years after the CEO resignation year.  
Through summary statistics, we find that CEO-chairman duality significantly 
reduces after CEO resignations, and such a decline is also significant for the delayed 
resignations. We also find evidence that suggests that after CEOs involved with 
financial wrongdoing resign, their companies tend to make outside appointments 
rather than inside appointments, especially for companies with delayed actions. 
When we examine companies’ stock performance around CEO resignations, we 
find that the market reacts significantly adversely to the resignation announcements. 
Compared with timely resignations, the abnormal returns are more negative for 
delayed resignations. In addition, when examining cumulative abnormal returns, we 
find that delayed CEO resignations cause a longer lasting negative stock price 
reaction. Our findings show that investors regard resignations of CEOs with financial 
wrongdoings as a negative event, because they may be worried about the companies’ 
operational decision making process and may be concerned that their interests have 
been violated by the departing CEO. For delayed CEO resignations, stockholders are 
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also likely concerned about the companies’ ineffective corporate governance and 
supervision mechanism, making the negative reaction more serious. 
When we compare the prior performance of timely versus delayed companies 
and graph the time series patterns in the operating performance for our sample firms, 
we find that delayed companies generally outperform the timely ones, which may 
imply that the delayed companies are reluctant to oust the misbehaved CEOs just 
because of their good performance. But all of our sample companies’ performance 
deteriorates in the year of the CEO resignation and gradually recovers afterwards; yet 
even three years after a CEO resignation, the performance does not recover to its 
pre-resignation level. 
Moreover, when we examine changes in the within-firm performance around 
CEO resignations, we again find that resignations of CEOs with financial 
wrongdoings have an adverse impact on company performance. In contrast to 
companies with timely resignations, companies with delayed resignations suffer a 
significant drop in their market-to-book ratio performance. 
In summary, both our time-series pattern and within-firm performance analyses 
support the results of our short-term and long-term event study.  
Such results may provide some enlightenment on the real-world company 
management. Because delayed resignations have a more pronounced negative effect 
on the companies than the timely resignations, companies should take the initiative to 
strengthen their corporate governance for timely actions. If CEOs are found to have 
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engaged in financial wrongdoings that jeopardize the company or infringe on 
shareholder interests, the company should take timely actions to oust the CEO, 
thereby alleviating the extent of the damage as much as possible. 
Because the disclosure system of listed companies is not perfect and some 
relevant variables are not available, our sample size remains a limitation of our study. 
Using a larger sample size in future research should help solidify our findings. Also, 
there may be less than 30 days between the date of an SEC action and the date of the 
CEO resignation. In that case, the SEC action may exert influence on the stock market 
which may affect the event study results. Moreover, because we employ accounting 
performance variables as indicators, the issue of comparability may be a concern for 
our empirical analysis. Even though listed U.S. companies need to adhere to 
Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) to prepare their annual reports, 
managers have flexibility with respect to some discretional accounting policies, which 
will somewhat reduce the comparability of company performance related indicators. 
Finally, in order to solidify the enlightenment on company corporate governance, 
whether our findings for timely and delayed resignations also apply to CEO 
resignations that are caused by reasons other than financial wrongdoings, or apply to 






Table 1: Sample overview by CEO resignation year 
 
This table reports sample frequencies by CEO resignation year. The sample consists 
of 95 firms announcing resignations of CEOs involved in financial wrongdoings 






% of Sample 
1996 2 2.11% 
1997 5 5.26% 
1998 6 6.32% 
1999 3 3.16% 
2000 7 7.37% 
2001 3 3.16% 
2002 15 15.79% 
2003 11 11.58% 
2004 4 4.21% 
2005 17 17.89% 
2006 17 17.89% 





Table 2: Sample overview by industry 
 
This table provides an industry distribution for our sample firms. Industries are based 







% of Sample 
2 Food Products 2 2.11% 
10 Apparel 1 1.05% 
11 Healthcare 4 4.21% 
12 Medical Equipment 2 2.11% 
13 Pharmaceutical Products 4 4.21% 
17 Construction Materials 2 2.11% 
18 Construction 1 1.05% 
21 Machinery 2 2.11% 
22 Electrical Equipment 2 2.11% 
23 Automobiles and Trucks 1 1.05% 
30 Petroleum and Natural Gas 3 3.16% 
31 Utilities 1 1.05% 
32 Communication 5 5.26% 
33 Personal Services 1 1.05% 
34 Business Services 22 23.16% 
35 Computers 7 7.37% 
36 Electronic Equipment 5 5.26% 
40 Transportation 2 2.11% 
41 Wholesale 8 8.42% 
42 Retail 4 4.21% 
43 Restaurants, Hotels, Motels 2 2.11% 
44 Banking 5 5.26% 
45 Insurance 6 6.32% 
46 Real Estate 1 1.05% 






Table 3: Summary statistics of firm characteristics  
This table reports the firm characteristics before and after CEO resignations for our sample firms. The CEO-Chairman dummy is equal to one if 
the CEO also acts as the chairman of the board. Origin is equal to one if the new CEO is promoted from within. 
Panel A: Firm Characteristics before CEO Resignation                   
  All Timely Delayed Difference of 
Means (2) - (1)   Mean Minimum Maximum Mean (1) Minimum Maximum Mean (2) Minimum Maximum 
CEO-Chairman 0.74 1 0.00  1.00  0.47  0.00  1.00  0.82 2 0.00  1.00  0.35 *** 
Compensation (in US$ thousands) 10,687.96  109.73  95,300.00  4,041.50  109.73  
       
21,100.00  
13,104.85  153.34  95,300.00  9,063.35 ** 
Age (in years) 54.15  30.00  80.00  53.00  41.00  71.00  54.54  30.00  80.00  1.54  
Years working with firm (in years) 17.34  2.75  45.21  15.37  3.08  38.00  18.00  2.75  45.21  2.63  
Years working as CEO (in years) 11.53  1.41  38.21  11.50  2.00  27.00  11.54  1.41  38.21  0.04  
Board Size 8.29  5.00  15.00  7.76  5.00  11.00  8.50  5.00  15.00  0.74  
Independent Directors Proportion 0.81  0.36  1.00  0.78  0.36  1.00  0.82  0.55  1.00  0.04  
CEO Ownership (%) 6.89  1.00  30.55  5.95  1.00  17.00  7.30  1.10  30.55  1.35  
Insider Ownership (%) 12.51  1.10  75.10  17.84  2.10  75.10  10.19  1.10  43.80  -7.65  
Institutional Ownership (%) 35.67  5.10  99.10  40.01  12.70  73.50  33.85  5.10  99.10  -6.16  
Panel B: Firm Characteristics after CEO Resignation                   
  All Timely Delayed Difference of 
Means (4) - (3)   Mean Minimum Maximum Mean (3) Minimum Maximum Mean (4) Minimum Maximum 
Origin 0.39  0.00  1.00  0.50  0.00  1.00  0.35  0.00  1.00  -0.15  
CEO-Chairman 0.28 3 0.00  1.00  0.28  0.00  1.00  0.28 4 0.00  1.00  0.01  
Compensation (in US$ thousands) 5,494.47  23.27  81,300.00  2,755.42  277.26  19,000.00  6,490.49  23.27  81,300.00  3,735.07  
Age (in years) 53.05  35.00  70.00  52.13  39.00  70.00  53.35  35.00  69.00  1.23  
Board Size 8.69  5.00  15.00  8.19  6.00  12.00  8.87  5.00  15.00  0.68  
Independent Directors Proportion 0.81  0.57  1.00  0.79  0.63  0.91  0.82  0.57  1.00  0.03  
Insider Ownership (%) 11.06  0.25  67.10  15.71  2.22  67.10  9.20  0.25  50.28  -6.51  
Institutional Ownership (%) 36.41  5.10  90.06  37.72  12.20  79.54  35.92  5.10  90.06  -1.81  
Note: Means 1 versus 3, 2 versus 4 are different at the 0.01 significance level. 
       
The symbols *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 levels, respectively. 
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Table 4: Cumulative average abnormal returns (CAARs) 
This table reports cumulative average abnormal returns (CAARs) based on a market 
model, using either equally weighted market index returns or S&P 500 index returns 
as the benchmark. The abnormal return (AR) for stock i on date t is calculated as 
                . The average abnormal return (AAR) for sample firms on date t 
is calculated as:      
     
 
   
 
. The sample firms’ CAAR for time (-j,k) is 
calculated as                 
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Market Model, Equally Weighted Index Market Model, S&P 500 Index 
Days Comparison CAAR Patell Z CAAR Patell Z 
(0, 0) 
All -7.82% -22.042*** -7.94% -22.112*** 
Timely (1) -5.99% -12.263*** -6.10% -12.098*** 
Delayed (2) -8.38% -18.407*** -8.50% -18.579*** 
Tests between (1) and (2) P-value (two-tail) P-value (one-tail) P-value (two-tail) P-value (one-tail) 
Original Mean Test 0.5018  0.2509  0.4755  0.2378  
90% Winsorize Mean Test 0.3438  0.1719  0.3485  0.1743  
80% Winsorize Mean Test 0.3517  0.1759  0.3504  0.1752  
Median Test (Wilcoxon test) Significance: 0.039** Significance: 0.039** 
Days Comparison CAAR Patell Z CAAR Patell Z 
(-1, +1) 
All -8.93% -14.404*** -9.03% -14.155*** 
Timely (3) -5.42% -5.927*** -5.49% -5.711*** 
Delayed (4) -9.97% -13.179*** -10.08% -13.013*** 
Tests between (3) and (4) P-value (two-tail) P-value (one-tail) P-value (two-tail) P-value (one-tail) 
Original Mean Test 0.2616  0.1308  0.2675  0.1338  
90% Winsorize Mean Test 0.3504  0.1752  0.2911  0.1456  
80% Winsorize Mean Test 0.3473  0.1737  0.3282  0.1641  
Median Test (Wilcoxon test) Significance: 0.171 Significance: 0.099* 
Days Comparison CAAR Patell Z CAAR Patell Z 
(-1, +3) 
All -8.50% -9.967*** -8.68% -9.865*** 
Timely (5) -4.82% -2.962*** -5.14% -3.099*** 
Delayed (6) -9.60% -9.747*** -9.73% -9.555*** 
Tests between (5) and (6) P-value (two-tail) P-value (one-tail) P-value (two-tail) P-value (one-tail) 
Original Mean Test 0.2825  0.1412  0.2931  0.1465  
90% Winsorize Mean Test 0.2189  0.1094  0.1980  0.0990* 
80% Winsorize Mean Test 0.0626* 0.0313** 0.1481  0.0740* 
Median Test (Wilcoxon test) Significance: 0.036** Significance: 0.030** 
Days Comparison CAAR Patell Z CAAR Patell Z 
(-3, +3) 
All -10.48% -10.168*** -10.75% -10.209*** 
Timely (7) -5.38% -2.735*** -5.65% -2.863*** 
Delayed (8) -12.00% -10.097*** -12.26% -10.074*** 
Tests between (7) and (8) P-value (two-tail) P-value (one-tail) P-value (two-tail) P-value (one-tail) 
Original Mean Test 0.1247  0.0623* 0.1295  0.0648* 
90% Winsorize Mean Test 0.1219  0.0610* 0.1054  0.0527* 
80% Winsorize Mean Test 0.0369** 0.0185** 0.0999* 0.0499** 
Median Test (Wilcoxon test) Significance: 0.022** Significance: 0.024** 
The symbols *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 levels, respectively. 
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Table 5: Mean compound buy-and-hold abnormal returns (BHARs)  
This table reports the mean compound abnormal returns based on a long-term event 
study that employs buy-and-hold abnormal returns (BHARs). We employ a 
Fama-French Time-Series Model with equally weighted market index returns as the 
benchmark. BHARs are calculated as               
 
               
 
   , 
where     is the buy-and-hold return for stock i in month t;        is the expected 
buy-and-hold return for stock i or the buy-and-hold return of benchmark portfolio in 
month t. 
 
Fama-French Time-Series Model, Equally Weighted Index 
Months Comparison Mean Compound Abnormal Return CSectErr t 
(0, +1) 
All -18.01% -4.880*** 
Timely (1) -6.81% -1.054 
Delayed (2) -21.04% -4.898*** 
Tests between (1) and (2) P-value (two-tail) P-value (one-tail) 
Original Mean Test 0.1156  0.0578* 
90% Winsorize Mean Test 0.0195** 0.0097*** 
80% Winsorize Mean Test 0.0054*** 0.0027*** 
Median Test (Wilcoxon test) Significance: 0.039** 
Months Comparison Mean Compound Abnormal Return CSectErr t 
(0, +3) 
All -21.90% -4.803*** 
Timely (3) -14.46% -1.610* 
Delayed (4) -23.99% -4.550*** 
Tests between (3) and (4) P-value (two-tail) P-value (one-tail) 
Original Mean Test 0.3901  0.1951  
90% Winsorize Mean Test 0.4103  0.2051  
80% Winsorize Mean Test 0.0740* 0.0370** 
Median Test (Wilcoxon test) Significance: 0.012** 
Months Comparison Mean Compound Abnormal Return CSectErr t 
(0, +6) 
All -29.58% -4.589*** 
Timely (5) -16.85% -1.163 
Delayed (6) -33.16% -4.617*** 
Tests between (5) and (6) P-value (two-tail) P-value (one-tail) 
Original Mean Test 0.2977  0.1489  
90% Winsorize Mean Test 0.3787  0.1893  
80% Winsorize Mean Test 0.1980  0.0990* 
Median Test (Wilcoxon test) Significance: 0.003*** 
Months Comparison Mean Compound Abnormal Return CSectErr t 
(0, +12) 
All -41.25% -3.099*** 
Timely (7) -22.77% -1.256 
Delayed (8) -46.45% -2.853** 
Tests between (7) and (8) P-value (two-tail) P-value (one-tail) 
Original Mean Test 0.3360  0.1680  
90% Winsorize Mean Test 0.3082  0.1541  
80% Winsorize Mean Test 0.2820  0.1410  
Median Test (Wilcoxon test) Significance: 0.071** 




Table 6: Abnormal returns by Jensen’s alpha approach 
 
This table reports the abnormal return based on a long-term event study that uses 
Jensen’s alpha approach. The Jensen’s alpha approach is expressed by:         
                                          , where     is the 
equally or value weighted return for month t for the sample firms within the previous 
T months;     is the risk-free rate;     is the return on the CRSP value-weighted 
market portfolio;       is the difference between the return on the portfolio of small 
and large cap stocks;       is the difference between the return on the portfolio of 
high and low book-to-market stocks;       is the difference between the return on 
the portfolio of previous 12-month return winners and losers stocks;    is the 
average monthly abnormal return of the sample firms over the T-month post-event 
period;   ,   ,    and    are sensitivities of the event portfolio to the four factors. 
 






 All -0.1082 -4.14*** 
(0, +1) Timely -0.0723 -2.09** 
 Delayed -0.1059 -3.77*** 
 All -0.0729 -3.37*** 
(0, +3) Timely -0.0417 -1.56* 
 Delayed -0.0623 -2.56*** 
 All -0.0575 -3.01*** 
(0, +6) Timely -0.0119 -0.43  
 Delayed -0.0558 -2.79*** 
 All -0.0215 -0.96 
(0, +12) Timely 0.0711 1.13  
 Delayed -0.0419 -2.56*** 
 All -0.0053 -0.32 
(0, +24) Timely 0.0219 0.49  
 Delayed -0.016 -1.64* 
 
The symbols *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 





Table 7: Pairwise correlations between the variables used in our logistic regression 
 
This table displays the pairwise correlation coefficients between our variables. The variables include a dummy variable that equals one if the 
CEO also acts as chairman of the board (DUAL), the natural logarithm of CEO compensation (LOGCOMP), the number of years the CEO has 
been working within the company (WITHFIRM), the number of directors sitting on the board (BDSIZE), the proportion of independent directors 
on the board (INDEPROP), the natural logarithm of total assets one year before the CEO’s resignation (SIZE), the market value of equity one 
year before the CEO’s resignation (MVEQUITY), and the operating return on assets one year before the CEO’s resignation (OROA). 
 
 
  DUAL LOGCOMP WITHFIRM BDSIZE INDEPROP SIZEt=-1 MVEQUITYt=-1 OROAt=-1 
DUAL 1.0000  
      
  
LOGCOMP 0.2984* 1.0000  
     
  
WITHFIRM 0.3768* 0.1289  1.0000  
    
  
BDSIZE 0.1113  0.2006  0.3543* 1.0000  
   
  
INDEPROP 0.1312  0.2230  0.1708  0.1596  1.0000  
  
  
SIZEt=-1 0.3381* 0.5912* 0.4244* 0.5876* 0.3253* 1.0000   
  
MVEQUITYt=-1 0.1721  0.4206* 0.0766  0.3068* 0.1965  0.5817* 1.0000    







Table 8: Logistic regression analysis of factors that may affect resignation timeliness 
The table reports the results of a logistic regression analysis in which we explore the factors that affect the timeliness of CEO resignations. The 
dependent variable (TIMELY) is a dummy variable that equals one when the CEO resignation is a timely action and zero when it is a delayed 
action. The independent variables include a dummy variable that equals one if the CEO also acts as chairman of the board (DUAL), the natural 
logarithm of CEO compensation (LOGCOMP), the number of years the CEO has been working within the company (WITHFIRM), the number 
of directors sitting on the board (BDSIZE), the proportion of independent directors on the board (INDEPROP), the natural logarithm of total 
assets one year before the CEO’s resignation (SIZE), the market value of equity one year before the CEO’s resignation (MVEQUITY), and the 




Obs DUAL LOGCOMP BDSIZE INDEPROP WITHFIRM SIZEt=-1 MVEQUITYt=-1 OROAt=-1 Intercept 
McFadden   
R-squared 
P-value           
(LR statistic) 
(1) 68 -1.6582  




    (0.0065) *** 
       








    
 
(0.3119) 
      








    
  
(0.2522) 
     
(0.7019) 0.0203  0.2305  
(4) 59 
   
-2.3099  




    
   
(0.3114) 
    
(0.6076) 0.0144  0.3132  
(5) 56 
    
-0.0279  




    
    
(0.4042) 
   
(0.3031) 0.0118  0.3878  
(6) 48 -1.6596  0.1682  -0.0844  -3.0209  0.0053  




    (0.0339) ** (0.7395) (0.6220) (0.2789) (0.8924) 
   
(0.5508) 0.1281  0.1909  
(7) 51 -1.6413  0.8458  
   
-0.5874  -0.0002  1.3156  -3.2530  
 
  
    (0.0499) ** (0.2455) 
   
(0.4849) (0.4740) (0.5789) (0.4284) 0.1483  0.1135  
(8) 47 -1.6204  1.1449  0.0721  -2.7351  
 
-0.6426  -0.0002  1.7128  -3.2072  
 
  
    (0.0654) * (0.1594) (0.7052) (0.3579) 
 
(0.4649) (0.3982) (0.4853) (0.4833) 0.1657  0.2197  
(9) 44 -1.6704  1.2090  
  
0.0236  -1.6629  -0.0001  1.2923  -3.2105  
 
  
    (0.0888) * (0.1384) 
  
(0.6244) (0.1946) (0.8133) (0.5981) (0.5112) 0.1842  0.1474  
(10) 40 -1.7120  1.7522  0.0659  -3.5142  0.0294  -1.7597  -0.0002  1.6546  -3.9109  
 
  
    (0.1071) (0.0772) (0.7466) (0.2947) (0.5567) (0.1980) (0.6276) (0.5131) (0.4589) 0.2216  0.2116  
The symbols *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively. 
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Table 9: Pairwise correlations between the variables used in our OLS regression 
 
This table displays the pairwise correlation coefficients between our variables. The variables include a dummy variable that equals one if the 
CEO resignation is a delayed action (DELAYED), a dummy variable that equals one if the CEO also acts as chairman of the board (DUAL), the 
natural logarithm of CEO compensation (LOGCOMP), the number of years the CEO has been working within the company (WITHFIRM), the 
number of directors sitting on the board (BDSIZE), and the proportion of independent directors on the board (INDEPROP). 
 
  DELAYED DUALITY LOGCOMP BDSIZE INDEPROP WITHFIRM 
DELAYED 1.0000  
    
  
DUALITY 0.3464* 1.0000  
   
  
LOGCOMP 0.1317 0.3076* 1.0000  
  
  
BDSIZE 0.1512 0.1228 0.2082  1.0000  
 
  
INDEPROP 0.1339 0.1628 0.2060  0.1246  1.0000    






Table 10: OLS regression analysis of factors that may affect short-term CARs 
The table reports the results of an ordinary least squares regression analysis in which we explore which factors may drive the short-term 
cumulative abnormal returns around CEO resignations. The dependent variable (CAR(i,j)) represents the cumulative abnormal returns during 
different short-term periods. The independent variables include a dummy variable that equals one when the CEO resignation is a delayed action 
(DELAYED), a dummy variable that equals one if the CEO also acts as chairman of the board (DUAL), the interaction term of DELAYED 
dummy and DUAL dummy (DELAYED*DUAL), the natural logarithm of CEO compensation (LOGCOMP), the number of years the CEO has 
been working within the company (WITHFIRM), the number of directors sitting on the board (BDSIZE), and the proportion of independent 
directors on the board (INDEPROP). 
 
CAR(i,j) CAR(0,0) - Equally CAR(-1,1) - Equally CAR(-1,3) - Equally CAR(-3,3) - Equally CAR(0,0) - S&P500 CAR(-1,1) - S&P500 CAR(-1,3) - S&P500 CAR(-3,3) - S&P500 
Obs 46 46 46 46 45 45 45 45 
DELAYED -0.0636  0.0316  -0.0038  -0.0002  -0.0650  0.0372  0.0111  0.0261  
DUAL -0.0528  -0.0293  -0.0261  -0.0001  -0.0530  -0.0208  -0.0077  0.0310  
DELAYED*DUAL 0.0431  -0.0662  -0.0403  -0.0584  0.0405  -0.0791  -0.0606  -0.0977  
LOGCOMP 0.0426  0.0950  0.0702  0.0721  0.0479  0.1014  0.0767  0.0802  
BDSIZE 0.0097  0.0156  0.0216  0.0227  0.0074  0.0151  0.0220  0.0242  
INDEPROP -0.0530  -0.2384  -0.2761  -0.2997  -0.0304  -0.2316  -0.2832  -0.3408  
WITHFIRM 0.0021  0.0035  0.0020  0.0019  0.0023  0.0035  0.0019  0.0019  
Intercept -0.3444  -0.6156  -0.4449  -0.4641  -0.3815  -0.6618  -0.4950  -0.5127  
R-squared 0.1134  0.2165  0.1655  0.1619  0.1230  0.2262  0.1712  0.1777  




Table 11: Performance prior to timely vs. delayed CEO resignations 
 
The table reports the prior performance of timely versus delayed companies from three years to one year before CEO resignations. 
 
Panel A: Average OROA  Timely   Delayed    
-3 0.0151290  0.0398802  delayed companies outperform 
-2 -0.0065222  0.0941300  delayed companies outperform 
-1 0.0022172  0.0650287  delayed companies outperform 
(-3,-1) 0.0034127  0.0667940  delayed companies outperform 
        
Panel B: Average adjusted OROA  Timely   Delayed    
-3 -0.0298053  -0.0074439  delayed companies outperform 
-2 -0.0571197  0.0513184  delayed companies outperform 
-1 -0.0412287  0.0267815  delayed companies outperform 
(-3,-1) -0.0429367  0.0239415  delayed companies outperform 
        
Panel C: Average adjusted MTB  Timely   Delayed    
-3 0.2768495  0.5659449  delayed companies outperform 
-2 0.3672847  1.8450470  delayed companies outperform 
-1 0.6447037  0.6065748  timely companies outperform 
(-3,-1) 0.4446699  1.0292967  delayed companies outperform 






Table 12: Differential performance around CEO transitions 
 
The table reports the differential performance within firms for up to three years before and after CEO resignations. Operating return on assets 
(OROA) is calculated as operating income before depreciation divided by total assets. Market to book ratio (MTB) is defined as the ratio of the 
sum of the book value of assets plus the market value of equity minus the sum of the book value of equity and deferred taxes to the book value 
of assets. Industry-adjusted OROA or MTB is adjusted by subtracting the company’s unadjusted OROA or MTB by the median OROA or MTB 
of all firms in the same industry classified using the Fama-French 48 industry system. T-statistics are reported in parentheses. 
 
       All Timely Delayed Difference        All Timely Delayed Difference 
       (1) (2) (3) (3) - (2)        (1) (2) (3) (3) - (2) 
A: Operating return on assets (OROA) 
            
(3-year average after) - 
(3-year average before) 
 
-0.0330  -0.0557  -0.0248  0.0309  
 
(2-year average after) - 
(2-year average before) 
-0.0349  -0.0598  -0.0258  0.0340  
 
(0.2829) (0.5390) (0.2952) (0.5555) 
 
(0.2936) (0.5405) (0.3307) (0.5348) 
                
B: Industry adjusted OROA 
            
(3-year average after) - 
(3-year average before) 
 
-0.0297  -0.0456  -0.0237  0.0219  
 
(2-year average after) - 
(2-year average before) 
-0.0307  -0.0491  -0.0239  0.0253  
 
(0.3526) (0.6205) (0.3458) (0.6656) 
 
(0.3746) (0.6249) (0.3913) (0.6353) 
                
C: Industry adjusted MTB 
            
(3-year average after) - 
(3-year average before) 
 
-0.6237  -0.5278  -0.6595  -0.1317  
 
(2-year average after) - 
(2-year average before) 
-0.5813  -0.3556  -0.6654  -0.3099  
 
(0.0080)*** (0.3020) (0.0126)** (0.7607) 
 
(0.0183)** (0.5088) (0.0161)** (0.4899) 
                 






Figure 1: Cumulative average abnormal returns (CAARs) by market model, using 
equally weighted market index returns as a benchmark 
This figure shows the CAAR for the period from 30 days before though 30 days 
after the announcement of CEO resignations. The abnormal return (AR) for stock i on 
date t is calculated as                 . The average abnormal return (AAR) for 
sample firms on date t is calculated as:      
     
 
   
 
. The sample firms’ CAAR 
for time (-j,k) is calculated as                 
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Figure 2: Cumulative average abnormal returns (CAARs) by market model, using 
S&P 500 index returns as a benchmark 
This figure shows the CAAR for the period from 30 days before though 30 days 
after the announcement of CEO resignations. The abnormal return (AR) for stock i on 
date t is calculated as                 . The average abnormal return (AAR) for 
sample firms on date t is calculated as:      
     
 
   
 
. The sample firms’ CAAR 
for time (-j,k) is calculated as                 
 
     
 
 
      
   
    
 





Figure 3: Cumulative average abnormal returns (CAARs) by market model, using 
equally weighted market index returns as a benchmark 
This figure shows the CAAR for the period from 1 days before though 30 days 
after the announcement of CEO resignations. The abnormal return (AR) for stock i on 
date t is calculated as                 . The average abnormal return (AAR) for 
sample firms on date t is calculated as:      
     
 
   
 
. The sample firms’ CAAR 
for time (-j,k) is calculated as                 
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Figure 4: Cumulative average abnormal returns (CAARs) by market model, using 
S&P 500 index returns as a benchmark 
This figure shows the CAAR for the period from 1 days before though 30 days 
after the announcement of CEO resignations. The abnormal return (AR) for stock i on 
date t is calculated as                 . The average abnormal return (AAR) for 
sample firms on date t is calculated as:      
     
 
   
 
. The sample firms’ CAAR 
for time (-j,k) is calculated as                 
 
     
 
 
      
   
    
 





Figure 5: Median unadjusted operating return on assets (OROA) of all companies 
around CEO resignations 
 
The figure shows the median of unadjusted OROA of all sample companies during a 
period of three years before and after the announcement of a CEO resignation. OROA 





Figure 6: Median industry-adjusted operating return on assets (OROA) of all 
companies around CEO resignations 
 
The figure shows the median of industry-adjusted OROA of all sample companies 
through three years before and after the announcement of a CEO resignation. OROA 
is calculated as operating income before depreciation divided by total assets. 
Industry-adjusted OROA is adjusted by subtracting the company’s unadjusted OROA 
by the median OROA of all firms in the same industry classified based on the 






Figure 7: Median unadjusted operating return on assets (OROA) around timely and 
delayed CEO resignations 
 
The figure shows the median of unadjusted OROA of timely and delayed sample 
companies during a period of three years before and after the announcement of a CEO 






Figure 8: Median industry-adjusted operating return on assets (OROA) around timely 
and delayed CEO resignations 
 
The figure shows the median of industry-adjusted OROA of timely and delayed 
sample companies during a period of three years before and after the announcement 
of a CEO resignation. OROA is calculated as operating income before depreciation 
divided by total assets. Industry-adjusted OROA is adjusted by subtracting the 
company’s unadjusted OROA by the median OROA of all firms in the same industry 
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